Despite its failure to cover the full range of restitutionary situations, the new Restatement improves upon its predecessor pragmatically and analytically, by covering a wider range of restitutionary circumstances in a unified manner. It succeeds pragmatically by providing the profession with a unified treatment of related material, and analytically by supporting the thesis urged several years ago that restitution in the context of failed agreements should be classified as a contractual remedy rather than as an appendage of a separate body of law known as Quasi-Contracts, or an even grander one known as Restitution.7 While the new Restatement neither accepts nor rejects this thesis, unified treatment of additional contract-related restitutionary situations may further expose its logic.
I. RESTITUTIONARY RATIONALE: RESTITUTION and RELIANCE OR RESTITUTION versus RELIANCE?
One of the advantages of reclassifying restitution in the context of failed agreements as a contractual remedy should be to clarify the rationale for restitutionary recovery. Since Keener's trail-blazing treatise on quasi-contracts8 was published in 1893, much academic orthodoxy has tied restitutionary remedies at law to the monistic concept of "unjust enrichment." Within a generation, however, the equation of unjust enrichment and quasi-contractual relief had come to appear inexact. Although granting that unjust enrichment was a significant underlying policy, Professor Woodward, in his text on quasi-contracts, found the term "enrichment" to be "unsatisfactory in that it connotes an actual increase of the defendant's estate." '? Woodward offered, instead, the concept of "receipt of a benefit." II The first Restatement of Contracts adopted Woodward's terminology and carefully avoided the unjust enrichment rationale.2 The Restatement (Second) ignores the conflict between the rationales of "unjust enrichment" and "receipt of benefit," frequently basing its rhetoric upon the former 13 while grounding its operative rules primarily on the latter. When a proper case for restitution is advanced, the Restatement (Second) usually allows recovery for benefits conferred whether or not the defendant has been enriched in estate. 4
One of the comments to the Restatement (Second) 16. Perillo, supra note 7, at 1221-23.
17. Restoring the status quo is an ambiguous concept. If the plaintiff has relied to his detriment, but has not conveyed any benefit to the defendant, it is impossible to return both parties to the position they occupied before either had acted. Thus, there are three conceivable responses: leaving the parties just as they are, returning the plaintiff to his former status by forcing the defendant to pay reliance damages, or a compromise between these two extremes. Only when either the second or third alternative is chosen does restoring the status quo accurately describe protection of a reliance interest. 18. Such recovery is not appropriate in all cases, but is frequently granted where the defendant is more responsible for the contractual failure than the plaintiff is. See 31. In the field of restitution there is a profusion of terms that are nearly, but not quite, synony mous. "Restitution" has become a term of art relatively recently, with the publication of the Restatement of Restitution in 1937. It encompasses rights at law known as quasi-contractual rights and certain equitable rights, particularly constructive trusts, that perform similar functions. "Unjust enrichment" is occasionally used, especially in England, as a synonym for restitution; one sometime hears of the "law of unjust enrichment." Its primary use, however, is to describe an ultimate fac "because X was unjustly enriched, he must make restitution." A "contract implied in law" is fictitious contract. The fiction was created to fit certain actions into the writ of assumpsit. A contra implied in fact is a true contract that arises from the tacit agreement of the parties. Because student practitioners, and even Blackstone were confused by the distinction between the two kinds of implied contracts, Keener and Woodward sought to extirpate the term "contract implied in law" from leg usage and to substitute for it the term "quasi-contract," which was borrowed from Roman law an only rarely used in the common law before 1893. Although the new term "quasi-contract" to hold, the old term successfully resisted extirpation to the further confusion of law students an lawyers.
32. Restatement If, as some have argued, a restitution action for breach of contract is contractual, rather than quasi-contractual,39 it seems wrong-headed to permit the injured party to recover in restitution the same amount on a losing contract as on a profitable one. To permit the same recovery is to ignore the balance of risks Restitution in contract arises in a variety of situations, from the extreme of a defaulting defendant to that of a defaulting plaintiff, and justice does not require that the same measure of recovery always be used. The comments to section 371 appropriately urge flexibility in fitting the measure of recovery to the particular case, while comments to other sections attempt to guide a "just" fit.
One suggests that doubts are to be resolved against a defaulting plaintiff."'
Another qualifies the general rule that where a contract is discharged for impracticability, the benefit is measured at market value;"2 it provides that where the benefit is destroyed by the event creating the impracticability, the "recovery may be limited to the measure of increase in wealth prior to the A may recover $1,500. 4 What is "just" in this case involving two innocent parties is not obvious, but the second Restatement's determination is apparently contrary to every case on point. At a minimum, these would allow A to recover the market value of his performance;55 some would even permit recovery for A's materials lost at the job site and other reliance losses."6 The comments do not attempt to explain why it is appropriate to limit A's recovery to $1,500.
Although the new Restatement's call for flexibility is commendable, perhaps a conceptual framework explicating when an enrichment value should prevail over a market value measure would enable us to understand this result. Absent such a framework, it is not clear why the roofer should bear the loss caused by the homeowner's fire to the extent that the market value of his services exceeds the increase in the homeowner's estate, and this illustration leads one again to suspect that here, as elsewhere, the drafters were unduly influenced by Keener's unjust enrichment analysis.
B. Contract Price as a Cap on the Measure of Recovery
Debate in the restitution area has long smoldered over whether the contract price or rate sets an upper limit upon the measure of restitution. 55. According to Palmer, there "appears to be no case authority, nor should there be," limitin recovery to the enhanced value of the structure. Recognizing that specific restitution functions to compensate for losses and to protect contractual intent helps justify subjecting the remedy to the general rule that restitution is unavailable where the claimant has fully performed and the party in breach owes no duty other than to pay a definite sum of money.92
Assume that an owner of two patents sells one to corporation A for a sum certain to be paid in the future and assigns the other to corporation B in return for a promise of royalties and best efforts to promote the invention. 89. "Specific restitution" is actually a substantive result that may be obtained by using an number of procedural devices, such as an equitable decree cancelling a deed, a decree ordering the defendant to return a thing to the plaintiff, or a judgment at law authorizing a sheriff to replevy the breach, the seller is entitled to specific restitution from B, but not from A. By selling the first patent for a fixed price, the seller has quantified the value of the patent to him. Thus, his losses are certain; a judgment for the contract price will fully cover his losses and fulfill contractual intent. On the other hand, a court cannot as readily value the damage to the seller from B's breach. Although the restitutionary interest-the market value of the patent-could probably be ascertained with the aid of expert witnesses, the expectancy interest-royalties-is likely to be highly uncertain. It is this latter interest that the court will protect,94
because the seller evinced no intent to sell at market value. Instead, he manifested his intent to participate in the earnings of the patent; it would be unfair to thrust a market-value bargain upon him. Thus, unjust enrichment plays no part in the determination that the seller may elect specific restitution. Rather, the determinant is that this remedy, and none other, will cancel an unjust loss suffered by the plaintiff and prevent distortion of his manifested intent.
V. RESTITUTIONARY RIGHTS OF A DEFAULTING PARTY
In 1937, a commentator described the status of a defaulting party who seeks restitution:
For more than a century the plight of the defaulting plaintiff has been a prolific source of controversy among courts and legal scholars. Until 1834 the unpaid wilful defaulter was generally not entitled to judicial relief. This was the "common-law" rule. But in that year the Supreme Court of New Hampshire fired the first shot in a hundred year's legal war. Disregarding the hallowed precedents of the "common-law rule" that court, in the case of Britton v. Turner, created the "modem rule," by granting succor (to the extent of $95) to a defaulting laborer. The reverberations of that shot threw the legal world into two camps, which have since then filled reams and reams of paper with attacks upon and defenses of the simple decision.95
The debate still rages. In the absence of a statute on the subject, some jurisdictions grant the defaulting party no recovery,96 while others permit recovery on some contracts but not others. Professor Palmer's recent treatise states that no 94 . A thorough analysis of cases such as this may demonstrate that Fuller and Perdue's division of contract remedial choices into three interests cannot explain the full range of contract remedies.
For example, although it is easy to state that specific restitution satisfies the restitution interest, it is quite clear that in our hypothetical, monetary restitution and specific restitution produce significantly different economic results and serve different goals. Similarly, it is possible to state that specific restitution protects the expectancy interest, but it does so in a considerably different way from that in which an award of expectancy damages protects it. In the case of the patent, it may be that the interest served is the inventor's autonomy and that this interest is protected separately from other interests. The first Restatement compromised, generally permitting a defaulting party to recover in restitution where his breach was not "wilful or deliberate," I terms that are difficult to apply to many contractual breaches.'00 The Restatement accurate, such parties today expect to be paid for their performance even if they breach, and they expect to pay fair value for the performance of others who breach against them. The drafters' choice wisely reflects these expectations.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of restitution for parties in default is an apt place to conclude, because it sounds a note of approval. While I have questioned some of the Second Restatement's provisions, I have no doubt that if its rules on restitution are followed, justice will generally result. The main difficulty that I perceive in the new rules on restitution is their treatment of the reliance interest, which the drafters have ejected from the restitutionary path and placed on an uncharted course.
